The
proposals inevitably had repercussions. So far, General MacArthur had
severely restricted the employment of air in the metropolitan area. In late
January and early February Marine Corps SBD's had bombed or strafed a few
pinpointed targets in the North and South Port Areas and had also hit some
obvious Japanese gun positions in the open areas of Luneta Park and Burnham
Green. One or two strikes may also have taken place against specific targets
within Intramuros, but all in all it appears that planes of the Allied Air
Forces flew no more than ten or twelve individual sorties against targets
within the city after 3 February. Before that time both carrier-based and
land-based aircraft had presumably limited their strikes to targets within
the port areas and to oil storage facilities in Pandacan and Paco Districts.5 Of
course some bombs had gone astray during these strikes and had caused damage
within Intramuros,6 while
additional damage within the Walled City had resulted from both American and
Japanese artillery fire the first two weeks of the battle for Manila.
Knowing and understanding General MacArthur's position on
the destruction of Manila--and large sections of the city had already been
battered beyond recognition--Krueger sought the theater commander's views on
the proposed air attacks, stating that XIV Corps' request would be approved
unless MacArthur objected.7
General MacArthur did indeed object:
The use of air on a part of a city occupied by a
friendly and allied population is unthinkable. The inaccuracy of this
type of bombardment would result beyond question in the death of
thousands of innocent civilians. It is not believed moreover that this
would appreciably lower our own casualty rate although it would
unquestionably hasten the conclusion of the operations. For these
reasons I do not approve the use of air bombardment on the Intramuros
district.8
Griswold and Beightler were not willing to attempt the
assault with infantry alone. Not expressly enjoined from employing
artillery, they now planned a massive artillery preparation that would last
from 17 to 23 February and would include indirect fire at ranges up to 8,000
yards as well as direct, point-blank fire from ranges as short as 250 yards.
They would employ all available corps and division artillery, from 240-mm.
howitzers down. In addition, 75-mm. tank weapons, 76-mm. tank destroyer
guns, and infantry 105-mm. self-propelled mounts would be used for
point-blank fire. Organic infantry 81-mm. and 60-mm. mortars and 4.2-inch
chemical mortars would add the weight of their fires, while from high
buildings such as the City Hall and office buildings on the north side of
the Pasig infantry heavy and light machine guns would blanket the walls and
interior of Intramuros before the assault.9 Just
how civilian lives could be saved by this type of preparation, as opposed to
aerial bombardment, is unknown. The net result would be the same: Intramuros
would be practically razed.
The bombardment of Intramuros in preparation for the
actual assault began on 17 February when 8-inch howitzers, with indirect
fire, started blasting a breach in the east wall, which, at the point of
breaching, was 40 feet thick at the base, 16 feet high, and about 20 feet
across the top. This was by no means the first artillery fire directed at
Intramuros. In support of previous operations throughout the city, 37th
Division and XIV Corps Artillery had earlier fired on pinpointed targets,
mainly Japanese artillery and mortar positions, throughout the Walled City.
Considerable damage to the ancient buildings had already resulted, and by
the time the assault preparation began most of the Japanese artillery and
mortars had long since been knocked out.10
The 8-inch howitzers of Battery C, 465th Field Artillery
Battalion, made a neat breach in the central portion of the east wall
between Parian and Victoria Gates with 150 rounds of high explosive. Later,
a single 155-mm. howitzer of the 756th Field Artillery, firing at a range of
about 800 yards, started blasting away to form the planned breach south of
Quezon Gate. With 150 rounds this weapon produced a break 50 feet long that
extended about 10 feet down from the top of the wall. An 8-inch howitzer
smoothed out the resulting pile of debris at the outer base of the wall with
29 rounds of indirect fire, making an easy ramp.
The 240-mm. howitzers of Battery C, 544th Field
Artillery, began bombardment to breach the north wall and knock out a
Japanese strongpoint at the Government Mint on the morning of 22 February,
8-inch howitzers lending a hand from time to time. The 76-mm. guns of a
platoon of the 637th Tank Destroyer Battalion used point-blank fire from
across the Pasig to blast footholds along the south quay and in the rubble
along the river's bank in order to provide the assault troops with landing
points.11
Throughout the night of 22-23 February, in advance of a
final barrage before the infantry assault the next morning, 37th Division
and XIV Corps Artillery kept up harassing fires against the walls and
interior of Intramuros.12 Meanwhile,
during the 22d, more guns moved into firing positions. As of morning on the
23d artillery to fire in support of the assault was disposed as shown in Table
3. In addition, many of the 105-mm. SPM's of the 37th Division's three
cannon companies took up positions along the north bank of the Pasig or east
of Intramuros. The 148th Infantry set up twenty-six heavy and light machine
guns in buildings north of the river to provide cover for the men of the
129th who were to make the amphibious assault. The 145th Infantry, which was
to attack overland from the east, would have cover from its own machine
guns, which would fire from such points of vantage as the upper floors of
the City Hall.
TABLE 3
ARTILLERY IN SUPPORT OF THE ASSAULT ON INTRAMUROS
|
Units and Their Locations |
Weapons |
|
North Bank of Pasig |
|
|
Battery B, 136th Field Artillery |
4 155-mm. howitzers |
|
6th Field Artillery |
12 105-mm. howitzers |
|
Platoon, 637th TD Battalion |
4 76-mm. guns |
East of Intramuros |
|
|
Battery A, 136th Field Artillery |
4 155-mm. howitzers |
|
Battery A, 140th Field Artillery |
4 105-mm. howitzers |
|
One piece, 756th Field Artillery |
1 155-mm. howitzer |
|
Six tanks, 754th Tank Battalion |
6 75-mm. tank guns |
|
Two platoons, 637th TD Battalion |
8 76-mm. guns |
Division and Corps Artillery at Rear Positions |
|
|
Companies A & D, 82d Chemical Mortar Battalion |
24 4.2-inch mortars |
|
135th Field Artillery |
12 105-mm. howitzers |
|
82d Field Artillery |
12 105-mm. howitzers |
|
Batteries B & C, 140th Field Artillery |
8 105-mm. howitzers |
|
Battery C, 136th Field Artillery |
4 155-mm. howitzers |
|
756th Field Artillery (less 1 weapon) |
11 155-mm. howitzers |
|
Battery C, 465th Field Artillery |
4 8-inch howitzers |
|
Battery C, 544th Field Artillery |
2 240-mm. howitzers |
|
Source. Relevant sources cited in n. 12.
|