Excerpts from the Statement of Lt. Commander Koichi Kayashima
(operations staff officer, Manila Naval Defense Force), 10
December 1949
Negotiations between the Japanese Army
and Navy
In the
latter half of December 1944 (I do not remember exactly the date
of negotiations, nor do I remember clearly whether I was the only
participant from the Navy in the negotiations or was accompanied
by a staff officer of the Southwest Area Fleet), I met with Col.
Kobayashi, staff officer of the 14 Area Army and conducted
operational liaison. At that time, based on the Manila Naval
Defense Force’s own estimation that there may be an occasion when
the unit will be ordered to withdraw from Manila to the hills east
of the city, I asked Col Kobayashi of his plan of disposition of
the Manila Naval Defense Force in this event. He replied that in
such a case the 14 Area Army (or the Shimbu Group) had planned to
dispose the Manila Naval Defense Force in the Antipolo area.
Early in January, the Manila Naval Defense Force, after
compiling various reports of topographical reconnaissance of
Antipolo and its vicinity, concluded that since that area was an
open terrain with its southern part utterly defenseless, it was
unsuitable for defense, and that by establishing positions in
Manila they would be able to resist longer. After that, the Manila
Naval Defense Force abandoned all consideration of Antipolo.
There were
surplus provisions in Manila. The Manila Naval Defense Force,
based on its own estimation mentioned [above], after contacting
the staff officer of the Shimbu Group, began to assemble the
provisions in Wawa from early January.
When the
Southwest Area Fleet Headquarters left Manila on 5 January, Rear
Adm. Hisagoro Shimamoto , assistant chief of staff of the
Southwest Area Fleet, and several other staff officers were left
behind in Manila, where they were charged with guidance of the
Manila Naval Defense Force and liaison with the Shimbu Group.
The Navy’s liaison with
the 14 Area Army and the Shimbu Group was conducted by the
Southwest Area Fleet until 5 January, and even thereafter by its
remaining staff officers. Therefore, I do not know the details of
liaison and negotiations between the two.
Some of the staff
officers remaining in Manila insisted on the possibility and
necessity of stubborn defense of Manila, citing the combat
experience of the naval landing units in the Shanghai battle. They
were of the opinion that the Manila Naval Defense Force, a
front-line unit, should devote itself to its immediate combat
mission and should not consider such matters as future withdrawal
from Manila. Such being the case, the shipment of provisions to
Wawa was also carried out as an arbitrary measure of the Manila
Naval Defense Force.
Before 15 February 1945
when the headquarters of the Manila Naval Defense Force was
ordered by the Shimbu Group to move to Fort McKinley, I was never
informed by the Shimbu Group to move to Fort McKinley. I was never
informed, either officially or unofficially, of any plan or
intention of the 14 Area Army, the Shimbu Group, or the Southwest
Area Fleet to withdraw the Manila Naval Defense Force from Manila.
Moreover at that time it was generally considered cowardly for a
subordinate unit to question its superior headquarters on such a
matter. Therefore, I had never confirmed the intention of the
superior headquarters regarding this matter.
In this connection,
there were signs of some understanding having been reached between
Lt Gen Yokoyama, commander of the Shimbu Group, and Read Admiral
Iwabuchi, commander of the Manila Naval Defense Force, concerning
the plan to have the Manila Defense Force withdraw from Manila
after its first engagement.
(Note: In mid-January,
Read Adm. Iwabuchi had a personal talk with Lt Gen Yokoyama at
Montalban. Moreover, a similar secret conference was held on 20
January when Lt Gen Yokoyama inspected Manila. Earlier, a decision
was reached by the Shimbu Group, Rear Admiral Iwabuchi, and the
Southwest Area Fleet staff officers at their secret tripartite
conference, concerning the defense of Manila and the transfer of
Army units there to the command of Rear Admiral Iwabuchi. Since
the staff officers of the Special Base Unit did not participate in
the conference, I do not know of its details. However, it is
presumed that there was such an understanding from the fact that
Rear Admiral Iwabuchi moved to Ft McKinley on 9 January [sic
February] and the fact that he sent me to the Shimbu Group
headquarters.)
However, since Read
Adm. Iwabuchi kept the matter a strict secret and did not disclose
it even to his staff officers, I cannot state positively whether
it was true or not.
The order handed to the Manila Naval Defense Force from
the Shimbu Group is as I have recorded in a separate statement. In
the order, the army term “Koshu” was used, but since I could not
understand its meaning, I asked an unidentified captain in Manila
concerning it. He explained that although “Koshu” meant stubborn
defense, it also provided for an issuance of a withdrawal order at
a certain time, and was different from “Shishu” (Note: Means to
defend to the last man.) in meaning. Therefore, I interpreted the
definition of “Koshu” as I have stated and had expected that with
the progress of the battle, the Shimbu Group would order the
Manila Naval Defense Force to withdraw from Manila when a certain
time came. [Note that these were conflicting strategies – to stay
and fight a stubborn defense, ensuring destruction of all
facilities, on one hand, or fight until ordered to withdraw and
move on the other. It was extremely difficult to prepare for both
at the same time!]
On 5 January,
Commander-in-Chief of the Southwest Area Fleet, Vice Admiral
Okochi, went to Baguio from Manila, and Read Admiral Iwabuchi was
ordered to command the entire naval units in the Manila area. On
the same day Read Admiral Iwabuchi received an order to the effect
that, “the naval forces in and around Manila (including units in
Corregidor and Cavite) will be placed under the command of the
Shimbu Group Army Commander as regards land defense as of midnight
of the sixth.” He also received an order on the 7th or 8th of
January from the Commanding Officer of the Shimbu Group that, “the
Manila Naval Defense Forces will remain in the present positions
and defend Manila, its vicinity and the Sakura Barracks.”
By this time, the Manila Army Force had withdrawn from
Manila City to the mountains east of the city, and consequently,
the naval units came to distribute their men throughout the city.
On or about 6 January,
the Commander in Chief of the Southwest Area Fleet ordered the
destruction of the piers, unloading facilities, warehouses, dock
repair facilities, etc. and the closing of the port in order to
make the use of harbor facilities impossible. The Manila Naval
Defense Force generally accomplished the order about the middle of
January. Necessary facilities required by the Japanese until just
prior to the arrival of the enemy were destroyed immediately after
the invasion of the US Forces. Cavite naval port was destroyed on
1 February, and the units stationed there withdrew to Manila.
On 21 January Noguchi
Force, Abe Battalion and other army units in Manila were placed
under the command of Rear Admiral Iwabuchi in matters regarding
land combat and preparations for combat. Also, in accordance with
instructions from the Shimbu Group, the Nishiyama Battalion was
newly organized and was stationed northeast of Manila, around San
Juan del Monte.
On 27 January, the operational plan of
the Shimbu Group was made known at Montalban. This occasion was
attended by the operations officer of the respective units under
the command of the Shimbu Group, and I represented the Manila
Naval Defense Force. Particulars of the operational plan which
concerned the Manila Naval Defense Force were as follows:
A.
Outline of
Guidance (main points)
The Group will concentrate its main force in a
retrenchment position to the east of Manila, store as many
munitions as possible in the encampment, and at the same time plan
for self-support and sustenance in the future, and will strongly
defend this position. It will also subdue the enemy attacks to the
front of the position by taking advantage of the natural
stronghold and fortification. At a favorable opportunity,
counterattack by infiltration will be made and will offer strong
opposition. On the other hand, Manila City and Fort McKinley will
be firmly held in order to prevent the enemy from utilizing these
positions. At the same time plans will be made to destroy the
enemy’s combat strength, and from the main position as attack on
the enemy from the rear will be made at a favorable opportunity.
B.
Duty of the Manila
Naval Defense Force
The Manila Naval Defense Force will
remain in its present positions and will destroy the enemy forces.
Battle
in Manila
On receipt of the following information (I think it was
information from the Shimbu Group) on 2 February, strict
precautions were enforced. ‘On 1 February the enemy infiltrated
into Bocaue in the north and into Aga [?] in the south.’ After
that absolutely nothing was heard concerning the enemy situation,
and in the evening of 3 February the enemy invaded the northern
part of Manila. Furthermore, by order of the Shimbu Group issued
at 2300 hours of the same day, the ground forces in Manila which
were previously placed under the disposal of Rear Admiral Iwabuchi
were under his complete command.
On the morning of 9 February Rear Admiral Iwabuchi moved from
the city to Fort McKinley because it was judged that, under
existing conditions, retreat from Manila would become very
difficult if delayed. Therefore, for the time being, he moved to
Fort McKinley where retreat was easier. In the evening of the same
day, Read Admiral Iwabuchi called Staff Officer Kayashima from the
city to Fort McKinley and ordered him to go to Shimbu Group
Headquarters to report on the situation in Manila and also to
report our views on withdrawal from Manila. I arrived at Shimbu
Group Headquarters on the morning of the 10th and reported the
situation. Thereupon, the Shimbu Group informed me that the Group
would depart on the 13th, and in the early morning of the 16th
would attack the rear of the United States Forces in the Manila
area. The Group ordered that the Manila Naval Defense Force make
plans to infiltrate through the enemy in cooperation with the
Shimbu Group. (Note: No order was given at this time to withdraw
from Manila).
Since the Shimbu Group indicated the plan for
counterattack, I did not say anything concerning the desire of the
Manila Naval Defense Force to withdraw from Manila at once. I
tried to return to Manila in the night of the 10th, but as my car
and guards had dispersed during the air raid that day, I could not
get in touch with them. The order of the Shimbu Group was to be
dispatched directly to the Manila Naval Defense Force by wireless
from the Shimbu Group, but as it was an important problem, I went
back to the naval communications station near the Shimbu Group
Headquarters and sent to foregoing orders to Rear Admiral
Iwabuchi. (to Manila City and to Fort McKinley). However, the
wireless apparatus was out of order, and the order was not
dispatched until the night of the 11th. I left the station on the
night of the 12th and returned to Fort McKinley early on the
morning of the 13th.
Before I returned to Fort McKinley, Read Admiral Iwabuchi
returned to Manila City with his adjutant just before noon on the
11th.
As
for the reasons for Read Admiral Iwabuchi returning to Manila, it
might not be right to try to guess what his feelings might have
been since he was killed in action, but the following are what I
presume to be the reasons in view of the circumstances at that
time.
A.
As the tradition of the
navy, an officer should fight the enemy ahead of his subordinates,
he could not leave his main force in the city and withdraw only
the Headquarters to Fort McKinley, and particularly, he could not
stand by and see his subordinates being seized and killed.
B.
As a result of the
investigation of Fort McKinley, it was judged that Fort McKinley
would fall earlier than the positions in the city. (When Rear
Admiral Iwabuchi asked me my views on this matter, I explained to
him as above.)
C.
There was a request from
Col Noguchi who had been ordered to command the army and naval
forces in the city [in Iwabuchi’s absence?], to the effect that he
was ‘in need of a competent staff officer who was well informed of
the situation as the organization and equipment of the naval
forces varied greatly, and the commanding of such forces was very
difficult.
D.
Staff Officer Kayashima
had not returned by the morning of 11 February and was presumed to
have died in action, and there were no other reliable staff
officers (according to the adjutant)
E.
In regards to the
withdrawal on 8 February of the Nishiyama Battalion to the main
position in the eastern mountains after abandoning their positions
in San Juan del Monte, a telegram came from the Shimbu Group
stating that, ‘naval forces numbering several thousands abandoned
their positions without orders and withdrew to the mountainous
regions in the east. This is very regrettable.’ Also, a navy
officer who had gone to reconnoiter the vicinity of Antipolo made
an impulsive report, after being abused by an army staff officer
in the said district, to the effect that ‘Has the navy been
defeated already? You cannot retreat into this sector.’ It seems
that such incidents had left a strong psychological effect on Read
Admiral Iwabuchi.
F.
The order of withdrawal
was not yet given after all. Fort McKinley was on the borderline
of the navy’s combat area, and according to circumstances, there
was a great possibility of being charged with desertion from the
front.
G.
In line with the
traditional belief of Japanese warriors of olden times, that is,
to choose one’s place of death and die bravely, it seems he, as
Commanding Officer of the Manila Naval Defense Force, decided to
meet his death in Manila.
On 15 February orders from the Shimbu
Group were received by the Manila Naval Defense Force Headquarters
to move to Fort McKinley and secure the said Fort.
However, the orders came too
late, and as Manila was surrounded completely, retreat was not
possible. On 17 February, the following order from the Shimbu
Group was received:
1.
The Shimbu Group will rearrange
the combat line near Manila and will prepare for combat in the key
positions in the rear.
2.
The Manila Naval Defense Force
(including the army Noguchi Unit) will cooperate with the said
group in the attack, and from the night of the 17th will begin an
all-out attack on the enemy and break through the enemy line. It
will first organize its combat line along the Marikina River,
thereby preventing the enemy from advancing east. At the same
time, preparations will be made for retreat to the key position in
the east. However, utmost efforts must be made to secure the
positions of Abe Force and Sakura Barracks [Fort McKinley].
The
order to secure the above two sectors was probably made to
maintain key positions for the retreat of Rear Admiral Iwabuchi.
Rear Admiral Iwabuchi replied that retreat was impossible.
Withdrawal from Manila
A.
The counterattack
by the main force of the Shimbu Group on the rear of the United
States Forces was unsuccessful. The situation in and around Manila
on 167 February was as follows:
1.
Forces in the city
were surrounded in the Intramuros sector and in Ermita. Forces in
Fort McKinley occupied an air raid shelter. U.S. tanks occupied
the top of the shelter, and only the entrance of the trench was
passable.
2.
Leaving one company, a special
attack unit, the main force at Sakura Barracks escaped during the
night of the 17th and consolidated its forces at Antipolo. The
forces in the city planned to escape on the night of the 18th but
could not carry it out. On the 19th and the 20th, a small number
of men attempted to escape, but almost all of them failed.
3.
From 24 February,
the wireless of the 31 Naval Special Base Force in Manila City was
disrupted.
4.
On 21 February the
Shimbu Group issued an order to the effect that ‘The Manila Naval
Defense Force, after leaving Manila, shall advance to Infanta
sector and will make preparations to guard the said sector.” A
non-commissioned officer who had escaped on 25 February reported
on 26 February that Rear Admiral Iwabuchi had committed suicide.