By the last week of January, Sixth Army had completed the
first phase of the Luzon Campaign. I Corps controlled the Routes 3-11
junction and positions from which to attack toward San Jose; XIV Corps was
pushing the Kembu Group back
from Clark Field. (See Map
- Sixth Army's Advance.) The army had secured its base area, carefully provided against the
threat of counterattack from the north and east, and projected strength into
position to protect XIV Corps' rear and lines of communication. General
Krueger thus felt free to devote more attention to the capture of the
Manila-Manila Bay area, the most important single strategic objective of the
campaign. On 26 January he had tackled the very practical problem of
actually getting troops into the city of Manila. On that date he had
directed XIV Corps to send forces south as far as the Pampanga River,
twenty-five miles below Clark Field and about an equal distance north of
Manila.1
XIV Corps' Drive South
Moving Out
XIV Corps' objective along the Pampanga River was the
Route 3 and Manila Railroad crossing at Calumpit, a flat land defile through
which passed the only highway and rail connections providing direct access
to Manila from the western side of the Central Plains. To the northeast of
Calumpit lies the formidable Candaba Swamp, passable only to light vehicles
even in dry weather; to the south and west are virtually impassable
swamplands, fish ponds, and marshy river deltas forming the northern shore
of Manila Bay. Although the Japanese had destroyed the bridges at Calumpit,2 XIV
Corps had to secure the crossing sites before the Japanese took advantage of
the natural defense opportunities afforded by the deep, unfordable Pampanga
to block the western approach to Manila. XIV Corps intelligence on 26
January estimated that the Japanese had few if any defenses along Route 3 at
least as far south as Calumpit. If this were so, the corps might be able to
secure the defile before the Japanese could change their minds about its defense.
On 27 January the 37th Reconnaissance Troop and the 148th
Infantry, 37th Division, started south from Clark Field toward Calumpit,
their first objective the Route 3 and railroad bridges over the San Fernando
River at San Fernando, thirteen miles below Clark Field at the junction of
Route 3 with Route 7 to Bataan. With Filipino guerrillas' aid, the 37th
Division's units secured both bridges intact on 28 January.3 By
afternoon on the 30th, after a minor skirmish or two with small groups of
Japanese along Route 3 south from San Fernando, 37th Division patrols were
within a mile of Calumpit and the Pampanga River.4
When on the afternoon of 30 January General MacArthur
made a personal reconnaissance south along Route 3 from San Fernando, the
pace of the advance impressed him as being much too leisurely, and upon his
return northward he informed General Krueger that the 37th Division units
moving on Calumpit had demonstrated "a noticeable lack of drive and
aggressive initiative. . . ."5 There
was no question that the advance south from San Fernando was slow,
deliberate, and cautious, but this was by design on the part of Generals
Griswold and Beightler. With only the 148th Infantry and the 37th
Reconnaissance Troop available for the advance south from Clark Field, the
corps and division commanders were unwilling to go too far too fast, for
they had little information on Japanese deployment south of the Pampanga.
Moreover, they knew that the Calumpit bridges were out and that no new
crossing could be constructed on the 30th. Griswold, accordingly, had
directed Beightler not to push his infantry far south of the Pampanga until
supporting tanks and artillery could also cross.6
Be that as it may, the impact of MacArthur's impressions
went to XIV Corps, whence Griswold passed it on to Beightler, and so on down
to the 148th Infantry, which immediately began preparations to move across
the Pampanga.7 MacArthur's
reactions also undoubtedly had considerable influence in prompting Krueger,
late on the 30th, to direct XIV Corps to speed its drive toward Manila,
orders issued simultaneously with those directing I Corps to seize San Jose.8 After
securing crossings over the Pampanga, Krueger's orders read, XIV Corps would
hurry its right southeast another six miles from Calumpit to Malolos. On the
left the 1st Cavalry Division, now attached to XIV Corps and assembling west
of Cabanatuan, would start south along Route 5 in concert with the 37th
Division's renewed drive down Route 3.9 Krueger
expected the two divisions to establish contact at Plaridel, where, seven miles east of Calumpit, Route 5 crossed the Angat
River. (Map
- The Approach to Manila)
Krueger's new orders limited the XIV Corps advance to the
Malolos-Plaridel line. Although he anticipated that the I Corps attack
against San Jose would be well along by 1 February--the day the 1st Cavalry
Division was to start south from Cabanatuan--Krueger was as yet unwilling to
discount the possibility of Japanese counterattack from the San Jose area.
He also had reason to believe that elements of the 2d
Tank Division had not yet
moved north through Cabanatuan and might be in position to fall upon the
flank of the 1st Cavalry Division. Moreover, as the 1st Cavalry Division
approached Plaridel, its left would become exposed to counterattack from
elements of the Shimbu Group, a
danger that Krueger believed would increase as the cavalry division moved
south beyond Plaridel. In brief, Krueger was unwilling to launch an all-out
drive to Manila until he had more information on the nature and extent of
the potential threats to the XIV Corps left.10 That
no threats actually existed made no difference--Krueger was basing his plans
upon his estimates of Japanese capabilities.
On 31 January, as the 148th Infantry crossed the
Pampanga, Beightler relieved the 145th Infantry at Clark Field and started
it south along Route 3. Without waiting for the 145th to catch up, the 148th
sped rapidly down Route 3 through an area becoming more and more densely populated.
The regiment secured Malolos against minor opposition on 1 February and on
the next day sent patrols south another eleven miles to Marilao, found void
of Japanese. On the same day one battalion worked east from Calumpit toward
Plaridel along the south bank of the Quingua and Angat Rivers. At Plaridel
one of Shimbu Group's many
provisional infantry battalions, about 500 men strong, in a short but bitter
stand held up the 148th's battalion until noon. Then the American unit
marched on through Plaridel and about 1700 established contact with elements
of the 1st Cavalry Division near destroyed bridges that had once taken Route
5 and the Manila Railroad across the unfordable Angat.11