The tactical battle of Manila, like many other urban conflicts, was a tale of fire and water. On 5 February, the 37th Infantry Division was stymied by raging fires that it had no way to fight or bring under control.  The possibility of fire is endemic to urban environments.  Manila showed that firefighting may be a feature of urban warfare for ground forces.  The Manila fighting also demonstrated that urban warfare may have an amphibious war aspect.  Both the 37th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division repeatedly had to cross rivers and esteros in assault boats and on pontoon bridges, often under fire.  Though little came of it, the Japanese defenders attempted an amphibious envelopment of American lines on 7 February, using barges on Manila Bay.  The final Manila operation for Americans was the search on 6-7 March by elements of the 129th Infantry Regiment, deployed on landing craft, of 32 ships sunk in the harbor where Japanese continued to resist. [li] The amphibious element is not unique to Manila.  Almost all great cities are situated on a river or harbor or both.  Urban fighting usually requires some projection over water. 

Several artillery issues at Manila are characteristic of urban warfare.  To avoid counterbattery fire, Japanese defenders put 75mm guns on trucks and moved them after firing.  A shell passing through a target was a concern in Manila; shelling a building could jeopardize friendly troops on the other side.  This is a case where sort of urban operations would necessitate more coordination than other forms of ground warfare.  Some other artillery issues are more difficult to resolve.  When is it justified to use massive area artillery bombardment, or air bombardment, when civilians may be present?  It is a question that probably must be answered case by case.  Commanders may be prudent to think through this question before they are in an operational situation.  Study of the Manila battle may help them to do that. 

Manila offered some tactical lessons for armor.  Urban warfare is often siege warfare.  Driving tanks around the city in itself will not bring victory but it may achieve the first stage of victory, which is to isolate the enemy.  Within Manila, tanks were useful for direct artillery fire and to suppress pillboxes in the open.  Tanks could not get into the buildings, however, just as tanks cannot get into caves.  Tanks accompanied infantry to the wall.  Once through the wall, infantry were on their own.  Tank movement was inhibited in Manila.  Tanks did not reach the 37th Infantry Division until 14 February because they could not cross the light pontoon bridges over the Pasig.  Japanese defenders had mined approach routes, so mine clearing operations delayed tank movement every time lines moved forward.  Electromagnetic mine detectors did not work because of all the metal already present in debris on the street. [lii] Sometimes rubble thrown down by the giant artillery bombardments obstructed the tanks.  Tanks were useful in Manila, but not as decisive as they would be in maneuver battles over open ground. 

Infantry did the hardest work at Manila.  Artillery reduced the walls, and armor accompanied them to the walls.  The greatest challenge, however, lay inside the walls.  Indoor fighting in Manila resembled World War I trench warfare in that it was heavily reliant on light suppressive fire weapons, flamethrowers, bazookas, mortars and grenades.  As in World War I, force fatigue was a potential problem, a problem that U.S. commanders astutely minimized by replacing fighting regiments with fresh regiments after about 14 days of heavy engagement. [liii]

While Manila offers many tactical lessons pertinent to the military dimension of urban warfare, it also offers many lessons in the other dimension of urban warfare -- the civic dimension.  In this dimension, problems were not always as amenable to technical solutions as they had been in the military dimension.

What were Manila’s lessons for civil affairs?  Operators faced two categories of problems, one being to preserve or revive the functions of the city as a whole, and the other being to provide for the multitude of citizens as individuals.  The 6th Army was keen to keep the major collective services in the city -- water and electricity -- from being destroyed.  The 1st Cavalry Division succeeded in preserving most of the water system, which lay outside the city, but the electrical steam power generator at Provisor Island within the city was destroyed, in spite of 6th Army’s good intentions.  Moreover, the city’s refuse collection stopped, the sewage system was damaged, public transportation ceased to function, and roads and bridges were destroyed throughout the central city.  Local government barely had existed in Manila during the early weeks of the battle, but was revived soon after MacArthur reestablished the Commonwealth Government on 28 February.  Local authorities, although they existed after 28 February, were heavily assisted by the 37th Infantry Division until the latter’s departure on 29 March.  The division also performed major service after the battle by keeping order, clearing mines and helping repair facilities.  The lesson of Manila as regards collective municipal functions, government, water, electricity and the like, is to do as the 1st Cavalry Division and the 37th Infantry Division did: safeguard them as much as  possible and, failing that, restore them as soon as possible. 

The multitude of civilians also provided many challenges for U.S. forces in Manila.  Civilians in pursuit of various purposes sometimes obstructed military activity for the 37th Infantry  and the 1st Cavalry Divisions.  One of these cases was the celebration by jubilant crowds at the beginning of the battle.  This public celebration impaired force movement, though it may also have helped troop morale.  On several occasions during the battle, civilians fled against or across the U.S. axis of advance, obstructing movement or fire.  The presence of civilians made U.S. authorities unwilling to use air bombardment and reluctant to use area artillery fire.  Americans believed Japanese were establishing positions in facilities such as hospitals and churches where civilians were present, knowing U.S. artillery would not fire on them there. [liv] In one case, at Santo Tomás, civilians were held hostage by Japanese troops in exchange for safe passage of lines. 

Besides hampering military operations, civilians often made positive demands on U.S. service support activities that could not be ignored.  At Bilibid Prison, the 37th Infantry Division was suddenly forced to evacuate then house some 1,300 internees in the way of an advancing fire.  Civilians injured in the battle, some of whom were victims of Japanese atrocities, came to U.S. medical aid stations for help. [lv] Finally, individual civilians immediately after the battle depended on military personnel to maintain order and protect them from looting and other transgressions. 

The lesson here for operators in an urban warfare environment is that they must be prepared to exercise patience in their operations given that in urban terrain, more  than any other terrain, there are likely to be numerous nonbelligerents present.  The lesson for planners in an urban warfare environment is to make sure that friendly forces have a superabundance of food and medical supplies, and of service assets, medical transportation, engineering, and so on.  During and especially after the battle, they may have to devote these to that part of the mission objective that is to re-establish the fabric of civic life.  The Manila battle is rich in lessons for urban warfare in its civil dimension as well as in its military dimension.